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The Unitrust in Estate Planning:
A Partial Panacea*t
I. INMODUCTION
The traditional conveyance, "To T in trust, to pay the income to
B for life, remainder to R," was adequate, from the trustee's view-
point, for administration of a realty trust, where little confusion arose
concerning what was corpus and what was income. The trustee nor-
mally maintained the original corpus (the real estate), collected the
income, paid expenses of administration, distributed net income to the
life tenant, and eventually conveyed the reality to the remainderman.
So long as buildings were kept in good repair, there could be little
complaint that the remainderman's interest was improperly handled,
and if the estate was managed with reasonable care, the life tenant
had little cause for objection.
When settlors began creating trusts consisting of corporate securi-
ties, however, the task of the trustee became more difficult. Since
shares of stock are, generally speaking, freely alienable, the consci-
entious trustee would often find it necessary to buy and sell on the
market in order best to increase the value of the corpus while main-
taining a reasonable income for the life tenant. If the corporation
whose stock were held in the trust reinvested earnings rather than
paying them out in dividends, the life tenant would be prejudiced,
since the reinvested earnings were potential trust income on the in-
vestment of trust corpus. On the other hand, the less the corporation
reinvested its earnings, the less its stock would appreciate in value,
and the remainderman would be relatively prejudiced. This conflict
between remainderman and life tenant has been compounded by the
introduction of stock splits, stock dividends, stock rights, mutual funds
and inflation.
To alleviate the confining pressures of this inherent conflict, and
thereby to free the trustee to pursue an investment policy geared to
maximum benefit for all beneficiaries, Mr. Robert M. Lovell has pro-
posed creation of the "unitrust,"'1 a trust administration device where-
by both life tenant and remainderman are benefited equally by a
growth-oriented investment policy.2
* The author of this note received the 1968 Dean's Award, given to the student in
the graduating class who is adjudged to have submitted the best senior dissertation.
1 This note was awarded third prize in the 1968 Estate Planning Competition spon-
sored by the First National Bank of Chicago.
1. Lovell, The Unitrust-A New Concept to Meet an Old Problem, 105 TRUSTS &
ESTATES 215 (1966).
2. Mr. Lovell suggests that the unitrust concept will eliminate income-principal
allocation problems, will permit the settlor's primary concern with the welfare of the
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This note explores applications of the unitrust in estate tax planning.
Part II presents general characteristics of the unitrust, including its
advantages and limitations. Part III discusses the use of the uni-
trust as a marital deduction trust, including prescription for adminis-
tration of the marital deduction unitrust in various situations involving
different sizes of estates. Part IV presents income tax considerations
involved in the use of the unitrust, under subchapter J of the Internal
Revenue Code. Finally, Part IV suggests amendments to the basic
unitrust form for maximizing its effectiveness in estate planning.
II. WHAT Is A "UNrrnusT"?
A. General Characteristics
A unitrust is similar to the classical trust in that property is con-
veyed to a fiduciary for management and investment for the bene-
fit of a beneficiary. Unlike the classical trust, however, the property
in the trust is administered as a single fund, into which all receipts are
added as they accrue. Periodically the fund is evaluated at its fair
market value and a stipulated percentage of that value is set aside
for "payouts" to the beneficiary at subsequent specified dates3 The
conveyance might read as follows:
To T in trust, for the benefit of B, to be administered as provided in
sections (a) and (b) of this clause.
(a) The trustee is directed to manage and invest the property conveyed
herein as a single fund, with all receipts to be added to such fund as
they accrue. Annually, on December 31, the fund is to be evaluated
to determine its fair market value as of that date.
(b) The trustee is directed to pay to B, in equal monthly installments,
amounts equalling six per cent per annum of the fair market value of
the fund as determined in section (a) of this clause.
Upon the death of B, if any property shall remain in the fund, I direct the
trustee to convey all such remaining property to R.
Of course, infinite variations on this simple theme are possible.
For example, it would be advisable for the instrument to provide
more detail in provisions over which litigation might subsequently
arise, such as adding to the direction that all receipts be added to
the fund, a description of receipts as "including, but not limited to,
interest, cash dividends, stock dividends, stock splits, stock rights,
rents, [etc.]." The conveyance as described is the basic vehicle, how-
life tenant to predominate, will reduce the need for costly accountings, and will free
the trustee from restrictions on his investment policy. Id. at 215.
3. Mr. Lovell's suggested unitrust is somewhat broader than the example given here
in that he envisages the unitrust as encompassing instruments directing distribution of
a dollar amount, as well as the percentage amount described. Id. at 215. But see
text accompanying note 36 infra.
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ever, and further discussion in this note will be directed to this
simplified model.
The novelty of the unitrust concept lies in its administration by
the trustee. The unitrust permits unrestricted investment manage-
ment by the trustee to the end of maximum benefit to all successive
beneficiaries, it eliminates conflicts between income beneficiaries and
remaindermen, it substantially avoids the need for costly accountings
beyond statutory requirements, and it reduces income-principal al-
location problems.
The unitrust concept is not without analogy in trust law (rather,
various attributes of the unitrust are in common use in some of the
more modem existing trusts, such as employees' pension fund trusts
and commercial investment trusts (mutual funds) ).4 The unitrust
simply combines many favorable aspects of more traditional trust
forms, thereby eliminating or reducing many of the problems caused
by failure of trust law to keep pace with current needs.
Mr. Lovell sees as one of the most advantageous characteristics of
the unitrust the freedom of the trustee to pursue an investment policy
calculated to produce the greatest growth, with maximum benefit to
the life tenant.5 The first of these goals can be achieved under the
modem discretionary trust,6 if the trust instrument specifically pro-
vides that the trustee is given complete discretion to invest for such
maximum growth.7 A completely growth-oriented investment policy,
however, normally works to the detriment of the life tenant, whose
interest is served by high income producing investments. The second
4. As Lovell points out, an employees' pension fund need not be administered with
the interests of any life tenant in mind, thus permitting an investment policy oriented
completely toward growth of the fund. Lovell, suprt note 1, at 219. Moreover, the
mutual fund has some of the mechanical characteristics of the proposed unitrust,
especially if the fund is in the form of an investment trust. If such a fund is to
qualify under subchapter M of the Internal Revenue Code ("regulated investment
companies"), it must distribute at least 90% of its income annually, such distribution
to include capital gains on sales of appreciated securities, as well as dividends on
stocks held in the fund. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 851-52. This distribution of
capital gains under traditional trust concepts would amount to a distribution of corpus,
under a stipulated percentage requirement.
These analogies to the unitrust are not, of course, directly in point, but they do
indicate that the unitrst has characteristics which are sufficiently familiar to permit
the trust industry and courts to handle them without undue confusion.
5. Lovell, supra note 1, at 215.
6. G. BoE:RT, TRusTs AND TRUSTES § 228 (2d ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as
BOGERT]; RFSTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 155 (1959) [hereinafter cited as
RESTATEMENT]; A. ScoTT, ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAw OF TRUSTS § 128.3 (1960);
McLucAs, Discretionary Trusts-Guides for Exercise of Power to Distribute Income and
Principal, 97 TRUSTS & ESTATES 210 (1958).
7. Note, Common Stocks in Trust, 113 U. PA. L. RIv. 228, 248 (1964). But note
that the instrument must so provide before invasion of corpus will be permitted. 32
Mo. L. Rxv. 280, 281 (1967).
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goal, maximum benefit to the life tenant, can be achieved by invest-
ment in high-yield securities, but this reduces growth, to the detriment
of the remainderman. An acceptable compromise can be reached by
directing a growth-oriented investment policy, with additional direc-
tions to pay a specified amount to the life tenant, with periodic
distributions to corpus where necessary.8 The unitrust achieves this
compromise by directing a stipulated percentage distribution, with
the implication (which might be specified) that corpus is to be
distributed to the extent that receipts do not equal required distribu-
tions. Thus, the unitrust has the advantages of a discretionary trust;
but what of its disadvantages? The typical discretionary trust requires
the trustee to make distributions in amounts which, in his complete
discretion, are appropriate for the "needs," or "comfort," or "well being"
of the beneficiary. Under traditional law, the trustee then has two
opposing forces bearing upon the exercise of his discretion: he must
attempt to fulfill the life tenant's perceived wants; but he must also
preserve as much of the corpus as possible for ultimate distribution
to the remainderman. Although this dilemma may be somewhat
alleviated by stipulating that distributions to the life tenant must
provide adequately for the "support" or "support and education" of
the beneficiary,9 whenever there is any discretion in determining the
amount of the distribution there is a potential complaint from the life
tenant or the remainderman (or both) that such discretion was
improperly exercised. The trustee in a discretionary trust is thus
caught between conflicting interests, in the exercise of either type of
discretion granted him (discretion in investment or discretion in
distribution). This problem is neatly solved in a unitrust by specific
directions as to distributions but with complete freedom to manage
for growth, since both life tenant and remainderman stand to gain
most from an imaginative growth-oriented investment policy. 10
8. Gelb v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1962); Barclay, The Lot of the
Income Beneficiary: Remedies, 104 TRUSTS & ESTATES 277 (1965); Note, Principal
and Income Allocation of Stock Distributions-The Six Per Cent Rule, 64 Micn. L. REv.
856 (1966).
9. 2 A. ScoTT, TRUSTS § 128.4 (2d ed. 1956) [hereinafter cited as ScoTr]; Bocarr
§ 229.
10. There have been other suggested trust forms which would permit maximization
of investment freedom while maintaining reasonable fairness as between the life
tenant and the remainderman. One such solution would allocate realized capital gains
to income, but would permit the trustee to accumulate income during periods when
the total "income" so allocated exceeded reasonable proportions. Note, Common Stocks
in Trust, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 228, 248 (1964). Another suggestion would require
distribution from corpus in the form of a "deficiency distribution" to the extent income
from the corpus investment did not equal the current bond yield. Since the difference
between the stock yield and the current bond yield would not be as great as the
annual appreciation in value of the corpus-share of the stocks, the deficiency distribu-
tions would be less each succeeding year until they disappeared completely when the
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Another difficulty concerning the trustee's discretion in traditional
trusts involves allocation of receipts; that is, given the principal-in-
come dichotomy, to which interest does the trustee attribute a partic-
ular receipt, such as a stock dividend? There have been several
statutory attempts to solve this problem, including the Kentucky
rule," the Pennsylvania rule, 2 the Massachusetts rule, 3 the more
recent "6% rule,"14 the "underproductive test,"5 and the "prudent
man rule."16 Of course, it has often been said, 17 and is so provided in
amount of income equalled the amount which the same original corpus would then
be yielding at bond yield rates. This method is denominated "anticipatory apportion-
ment." Id. at 252-55. This plan has been criticized in Barclay, supra note 8. Mr.
Barclay, in turn, proposes a trust with invasion-of-corpus provisions, with additional
provision for adjustment of stipulated (dollar) payments according to periodic com-
parisons with the cost of living index. Id. And finally, a "percentage trust" has been
proposed, wherein the corpus could be invested in growth securities, with the trust
instrument providing that the trustee should distribute to the life tenant amounts which
fairly reflect the income on a fund of comparable size invested more for production
of income. Clark, Power to Invest Without Yield, 100 TRUSTS & ESTATES 495 (1961);
Wells, Pity the Poor Income Beneficiary-How to Reconcile Growth and Yield?, 103
TRUsTS & ESTATES 119 (1964).
11. All dividends, including stock dividends made from accrued earnings, are in-
come. Note, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 284, 285 (1959).
12. This rule requires apportioning receipts between the life tenant and the re-
mainderman so as to preserve the initial value of the trust asset. See Note, supra note
8, at 859; Cohan, Accounting Considerations of Apportionment by Trustees of Receipts
from Stock, 36 TEMP. L.Q. 121 (1963); Niles, Fosdick, Cunningham and Chaos-
Ways Out of Apportionment Dilemma, 98 TRUSTS & ESTATES 924 (1959).
13. The Massachusetts Rule allocates all stock dividends to corpus, unless the stock
distributed is not that of the distributing corporation. This is now the majority rule,
having been incorporated in REvisED UNnwonM PRINCEPAL AND INCOME ACT, which
has been adopted in 25 states. See also RESTATEMENT § 236(b).
14. Stock dividends amounting to less than 6% of outstanding stock are treated as
income. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:14A(a) (Supp. 1967) (similar rule, but
uses 4% as determinative percentage); N.Y. ESTATES, PowERS AND TRUSTS LAW §
11-2.1(e)(2) (McKinney 1967); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 3470.5 (Pardon 1964).
This rule was considered for adoption by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
but was rejected in favor of the Massachusetts Rule. Bogert, Uniform Principal and
Income Act Revised, 101 TRUSTS & ESTATES 787 (1962). See also ABA REAL PROP-
ERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST LAW SECTON, Uniform Revised Principal and Income Act
18 (Aug. 6-7, 1962).
15. Section 12 of the REvisED UNIwOEm PRNcipAL AND INCOmE ACT provides that
if the yield on corpus property is less than 1% of its inventory value for more than
a year, it shall be considered "underproductive," shall be sold, and the proceeds
apportioned. See also Barclay, The Lot of the Income Beneficiary, 104 TRUSTS &
ESTATES 144 (1965). It should also be noted that if the property in the corpus is
underproductive, the marital deduction will be denied unless the surviving spouse has
the power to require sale of such property for more beneficial investment. Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2056(b)-5(f)(4), (5) (1967).
16. Determination here rests on whether the receipt would be considered allocable
to principal or income by men of "prudence, discretion, and intelligence in the manage-
ment of their own affairs." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3526(a)(1) (Supp. 1966).
17. ABA REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST LAW SECTION, Report of the Sub-
committee on Trusts and Estates: Tax Burden Genesis of Beneficiary Conflicts 192
(Aug. 11-13, 1963). But see Halbach, Problems of Discretion in Discretionary Trusts,
61 CoLUM. L. REv. 1425, 1427 (1961).
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most statutes," that the settlor can eliminate this problem by directing
how such receipts shall be allocated. But even a lengthy and care-
fully prepared itemization of possible receipts can be made obsolete
by the invention of a new corporate distribution technique. The
unitrust avoids this difficulty by directing that all receipts, of what-
ever form, be added to the fund, to be evaluated later in calculating
the directed percentage distribution. 9
Finally, the unitrust idea provides a method through which the life
tenant's interest can keep pace with business growth and inflation by
giving him a percentage participation in all such growth, whether
represented by dividends or growth from reinvestment.20 And, even
more ideally, it provides a hedge against all but the most severe and
long-lived depression by continuous bolstering of the fund through the
infusion of all receipts.
B. Limitations
Although the unitrust concept can eliminate many of the problems
which plague trust managers, there are some difficulties, both of
traditional and modem origin, which it cannot solve. Lovell noted,
for example, that the unitrust does not eliminate the need for judg-
ment on the part of the trustee.2' In fact, use of a unitrust probably
requires even more investment judgment, since one of the major
advantages of the idea is that it permits the trustee to exercise un-
trammelled investment discretion, to the end of maximum fund
growth.
18. ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 58, § 76 (1960); Arz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-1082 (1956);
CAL. Civ. CODE § 730.02 (Supp. 1967); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 57-4-2 (1964);
CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 45-111 (1959); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 690.03 (1944); IDAH1O
CODE ANN. § 68-1002(a)(1) (Supp. 1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 160 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1967); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 58-902 (Supp. 1967); Ky. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 386.200 (3d ed. Baldwin 1963); MD. ANN. CODE art. 75B, § 2(a)(1) (Supp.
t967); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 62-1902 (1962); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 33-5-2 (Supp.
1967); N.Y. ESTATES, POWERS AND TnusTS LAW § 11-2.1(a)(1) (1967); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 37-2 (1966); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 175.26 (1963); ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 129.020 (1963); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 3470.2 (Purdon 1964); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 67-504(a)(1) (Supp. 1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-703 (Supp. 1967); Tx. REV.
Civ. STAT. art. 7425b-26 (Vernon 1960); UTAH CODE ANN. § 22-3-2 (1953); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 14, § 3302 (1959); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-254 (1959); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 36-6-2 (1966); Vis. STAT. ANN. § 231.40(2) (Supp. 1967); Wyo. STAT. ANN.
§34-375(a)(i) (Supp. 1965).
19. Fees and expenses would be subtracted directly from the general fund, thus
further eliminating the need for allocation of these items. This would probably alleviate
the conflict of interests regarding the trustee-executor's decision as to whether to take an
estate tax deduction for administration fees under § 2053 or an income tax deduction
under § 642(g).
20. See Aronstein, Toward Growth With Fair Return-Plea for Imagination in
Solving Plight of Income Beneficiary, 104 TRusTs & ESTATES 788 (1965).
21. Lovell, supra note 1, at 217.
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Lovell also suggested that the unitrust should not be used with a
charitable reminder 2 This would be true if it be assumed that the
receipts of the unitrust will in some years be less than the stipulated
percentage payout, so as to require an invasion of "corpus" in tradi-
tional trust terms. The problem is created by Treasury Department
pronouncements that trusts which may distribute corpus are not
deductible to the extent that corpus is not exempt from potential
distributions. The Regulations provide that the estate tax charitable
deduction will be limited to "that portion, if any, of the property or
fund which is exempt from an exercise of the power [to distribute
corpus]."2 Closely analogous to this provision is Revenue Ruling
60-385,24 which provides that where the trust contains shares of a
regulated investment company, and if the governing instrument or
local law permits or requires distribution of the capital gain portion of
the company's dividends as income, no charitable deduction will be
allowed, "since no known formula has been advanced for ascertaining
the value of the charitable interest." The unitrust can avoid these
pitfalls.
In Northeastern Pennsylvania National Bank & Trust Co. v. United
States,25 the Supreme Court held that it is possible to determine, for
federal estate tax purposes, the amount of corpus needed to produce
income in a stipulated dollar amount per month, by employment of
projected rates of return. Assume that such projected rate is com-
puted to be four per cent per annum. If the unitrust's stipulated
payout percentage is five per cent, it is clear that payouts will include
some "corpus" for each year that the projected rate of return is
correct. However, it is also clear that the amount of corpus distribu-
tion can be calculated at the time of the establishment of the trust,
since the payout percentage bears a direct relation both to the amount
of the original fund and to the projected return rate. Therefore, under
the Regulation described above, the portion of the "corpus" which
is exempt from the direction to distribute "corpus- is ascertainable.
And since it is ascertainable, it would seem that a rule analogous to
Revenue Ruling 60-385 would not be applied. On this same principle,
if the payout percentage were three per cent, it appears that payouts
would never include "corpus," and the Regulation should present
no problem at all. The same result would follow if the payout per-
centage equals the projected rate of return. Therefore, it appears that
after Northeastern Pennsylvania the unitrust may be used with a
22. Id. at 218.
23. Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-2(b) (1966).
24. 1960-2 Cum. BuLL. 77.
25. 387 U.S. 213 (1967).
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charitable remainder. However, such use may be hazardous if it is
desired to avoid litigation, since the Commissioner might be expected
to question this reasoning.
The simple unitrust, as described in the sample above, will not by
itself necessarily provide a complete hedge against inflation, since
business conditions of the future cannot be predicted with great
accuracy. Although a five per cent payout may seem ample today,
it may not be adequate twenty years from now, due to unforeseen
disparities between the cost of living and stock value appreciation."
Moreover, today's ample income may not be sufficient to meet, for
example, unanticipated medical expenses. This problem can be
remedied in any one of several ways, including an additional direc-
tion for supplemental payouts upon specific contingencies, and pro-
vision for periodic resetting of the payout percentage on the basis of
some external standard, such as the cost of living index.27
Some state statutes require periodic accountings which include
indications of the trustee's allocation of receipts as between corpus
and income.28 Of course, the very nature of the unitrust makes this
particular aspect of the accounting superfluous, but the requirement
could prove troublesome if imposed strictly on the trustee of the
unitrust. Not only would such a requirement necessitate the keeping
of books similar to those for a traditional trust, and thus cause addi-
tional and unnecessary expense to the trust, but it would also explicitly
set forth the basis for the very conflict of interests between life tenant
and remainderman which the unitrust is designed to eliminate. It is
hoped that the corpus-income accounting requirement would not be
imposed on the unitrustee, since the reason for such accountings is
to enable the various beneficiaries to monitor the trustee's allocations
and such watchfulness is irrelevant to the unitrust.
New York law provides that it is against public policy for a trust
instrument to attempt to grant to a testamentary trustee the power
to make a "binding and conclusive fixation of the value of any asset
for purposes of distribution or allocation."29 This provision is a
potential stumbling block for the unitrust in New York, since an
integral part of the unitrust concept is the periodic fair-market valua-
26. See Barclay, supra note 8, at 277; Halbach, supra note 17, at 1426.
27. Barclay, supra note 8, at 279.
28. CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 45-268 (Supp. 1965); DEL. CODE ANN. Chancery
Rule 117 (1953) ("where applicable"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 737.12 (1964); IND. ANN.
STAT. §§ 31-701, -702 (Burns Supp. 1967); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 59-1602 (Supp.
1967), § 59-1606 (1964); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 206, § 2 (1955); MiNN. STAr. ANN.
§ 501.34 (1947); NEB. BEv. STAT. § 30-1801 (1964); NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 165.040
-.140 (1956); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-2-3, -13 (1953); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 30.30.030 (1961). See also UNwnort TRUSTEES AccoUNTINc AcT § 3.
29. N.Y. ESTATES, PowERs AND TRUSTS LAw § 11-1.7(a)(2) (1967).
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tion of the trust fund for determining subsequent payouts pursuant
to the percentage stipulation. However, the purpose of the statute
was to protect settlors and beneficiaries from instruments ingeniously
drawn to limit the liability of institutional trustees for lack of due
care,30 so the statute does not necessarily preclude the unitrust. Since
the unitrust concept does not attempt to eliminate the accountability
of the trustee for lack of discretion, and since assent by the beneficiary
would obviate the effect of this provision, the unitrust should be
available to New York settlors.
Various problems which may arise with regard to income taxation
of the unitrust will be discussed in Part IV below. Estate tax prob-
lems will be treated in Part III.
There remain two questions with regard to the unitrust-questions
which cannot be answered with confidence at this time. First, will the
courts accept the unitrust? It is different, and it has some character-
istics which do not fit comfortably within the framework of existing
trust law. However, these differences do not seem to require rejection
of the concept and there appears no good reason that it should not
be accepted with enthusiasm. Second, will trustees accept the idea?
It may involve some litigation at first, but the advantages seem
substantially to outweigh any such consideration. Absent some ad-
verse turn in the courts or the Internal Revenue Service, trustees
should welcome the unitrust.
III. Tm UNIRUST AND = MAmrrAL DEDUc'rON
A. The "Estate Trust" as a Unitrust
Lovell concluded that the unitrust as a marital deduction trust
would be restricted to the form of an "estate trust."31 Since an estate
trust is not a "terminable interest" for federal estate tax purposes, '
it is not subject to the restrictive provisions of section 2056(b) (5).
Hence the fact that a trust instrument might provide for, or result in,
30. Book 13, N.Y. DECED. EST. LAW 635-36 (Historical Note) (1949).
31. Lovell, supra note 1, at 218-19. The "estate trust" is one under which all bene-
ficial interests are in the surviving spouse and her estate-the income is payable to the
spouse for life, with payment of the corpus to her estate. Casner, Estate Planning
Under the Revenue Act of 1948-The Regulations, 63 HAIrv. L. BEv. 99, 100 (1949).
32. The estate trust is not a terminable interest within the meaning of the estate tax
provisions, because the interest of the surviving spouse in the property does not
terminate upon her death or the occurrence of any other contingency. See INT. Rv.
CODE of 1954, § 2056(b)(1); Treas.. Reg. §§ 20.2056(a)-2, (b)-1 (1966). If the
trust were a terminable interest, Treasury Regulation § 2056(b)-5(a)(1) & (2)
would require that the surviving spouse have a right to all the trust income for life,
payable annually or more frequently. Since it is possible that in some years unitrust
receipts would exceed the payout percentage, the unitrust would thus appear not to
qualify for the marital deduction.
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the accumulation of income would not disqualify the trust for the
marital deduction;3 that is, a unitrust in the form of an estate trust
would qualify although the payout percentage did not equal or exceed
the income percentage. Developments since the formulation of the
unitrust idea, making the unitrust arguably appropriate for any marital
deduction trust, will be discussed below with regard to the power
of appointment trust. However, there are some potential difficulties
concerning the "estate unitrust" under various state laws.
1. "Payable to Beneficiary's Estate."-Professor Casner has sug-
gested that some state laws may not permit distribution to the estate
of the life beneficiary.34 An adverse ruling on this point could dis-
qualify the estate trust for the marital deduction, since the surviving
spouse's interest would become terminable, and the interest would
pass to someone else upon termination.35 To the extent that this
analysis is correct for specific states, of course, the "estate unitrust"
would be inappropriate as a marital deduction trust. However, this
does not lessen the value of the unitrust itself, since the estate unitrust
would fare no differently than would a traditional estate trust.
2. Rules Against Accumulation.-Since the unitrust payout per-
centage is static as fixed by the governing instrument, and since
receipts fluctuate under the influence of many variables, it can be
assumed that sometimes the annual payout will not completely con-
sume the prior year's receipts.3 Under more traditional trust account-
ing principles, this would amount to the addition of income to corpus,
or the accumulation of income. While the accumulation of income
for minors during their minority has generally been accepted,37 many
states traditionally forbade income accumulation for adults.38 Today,
33. ABA BFAL PRoPETy, PROBATz AND TRUST SEcaOi, Report of the Subcommittee
on Estate Planning and the Marital Deduction 82, 93 (Aug. 11-13, 1963).
34. Casner, supra note 31, at 101-02.
35. Id. at 102. However, he predicts that the courts will generally follow the view
already taken by some courts, that an estate may be the beneficiary of a gift. Id. This
holding is implicit in Commissioner v. Ellis, 252 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1958).
36. Of course if the percentage is set high enough, payouts will always exceed
receipts. This would result in continuous depletion of the fund to the point at which,
for all practical purposes, the trust will become worthless. The discussion in this note
assumes that the stipulated payout percentage will be set at about current expected
income, or income-plus-growth, rates, so that the unitrust will continue as a viable
income producer for the life of the life tenant. While this result is, of course, not
necessary under the unitrust principle, most settlors establishing testamentary trusts
for their wives would probably reject the thought that at some not too distant date the
trust would cease to produce and the widow would be without income. But see the
discussion regarding the types of situations in which a unitrust should be used, in
Part III, § B below.
37. Ar. CODE tit. 47, § 146 (1958); S.D. CODE § 51.0304 (Supp. 1960).
38. See generally Powell, Changes in the New York Statutes on Perpetuities and
Accumulations: A Report and a Proposal, 58 CoLum. L. REv. 1196 (1958). South
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however, most states permit all such accumulations, at least for periods
not longer than the applicable rule against perpetuities, and at least
one state has provided that such period shall be measured by actual
events, rather than mere possibilities.4 Therefore rules against ac-
cumulations are not significant deterrents to the marital deduction
unitrust. However, since income accumulation aspects of the unitrust
are not universally acceptable, some caution is indicated.
3. State Allocation Rules.-Rules for allocations of receipts between
income and corpus should not affect the unitrust. Both Uniform
Princital and Income Acts defer to explicit allocation provisions in
the governing instrument, and provide for allocation of stock splits
and stock dividends to corpus only in the absence of such specific
instructions. 4' The nature of specifications for treatment of receipts
in the unitrust should eliminate any need to consider statutory alloca-
tion provisions in states which have adopted this version of the uni-
form acts.4 This same argument should apply in states which employ
Dakota apparently still forbids such accumulations. The statutory direction against
such accumulations was repealed in 1957, but the section permitting accumulations
during minority still provides that accumulations must end when the beneficiaries
reach majority. See S.D. CODE OF 1939. § 51.0307 (repealed 1957); S.D. CODE §
51.0304 (Supp. 1960).
39. ScoTT § 62.11, at 560. For statutory authorization for accumulations, see
CAL. CIV. CODE § 724 (Supp. 1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 153 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1967); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 67-412 (1947); NEV. REV. STAT. § 166.150
(Supp. 1965); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 230.37 (Supp. 1967). England now permits accumu-
lations for 21 years from the date of the grant, plus the minority of any persons in
being or enventre as mere at that date. Discussed in Battersby, The Perpetuities and
Accumulations Act, 1964, 108 SOL. J. 627 (1964). Alabama limits trusts for accumu-
lation to 10 years, except for minors. ALA. CODE tit. 47, § 146 (1958).
40. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.6 (Purdon Supp. 1966). The New York statute
appears to adopt this idea by providing that "[an accumulation directed to continue
for a period extending beyond the expiration of such time terminates upon such
expiration." N.Y. ESTATES, PowEns AND TRusTS LANw § 9-2.1(b) (1967). This doc-
trine has been denominated "wait-and-see." Cohen, The Rule Against Accumulations
and "Wait and See," 33 TEMPLE L.Q. 34 (1959).
41. UNIFonM PjINciPAL AND INcOME ACT §§ 2, 5 (1931 version); REVISED UNWOM
PIuNcHAL AND INcomm AcT §§ 2, 6.
42. ALA. CODE tit. 58, § 79 (1960); A=iz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-1085(A) (1956);
CAL. CIV. CODE § 730.06(a) (Supp. 1967); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 57-4-5(1) (1964);
CoNN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 45-113(1) (1959); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 690.06(1) (1944);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 68-1006(a) (Supp. 1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 164(1)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 58-905(1) (1964); Ky. REV.
STAT. 386.230(1) (3d ed. Baldwin 1963); MD. ANN. CODE art. 75B, § 6(a) (Supp.
1967); MoNeT. REV. CODES ANN. § 67-1905(1) (1962); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 33-5-5(1)
(Supp. 1967); N.C. GEsr. STAT. § 37-5(a) (1966); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60 §
175.29(A) (1963); OnE. REv. STAT. § 129.050(1) (1963); S.C. CODE ANN. § 67-
509(a) (Supp. 1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-706(1) (Supp. 1967); T.Ex. REV. Crv.
STAT. ANN. art. 7425b-29(A) (Vernon 1960); UTAH CODE ANN. § 22-3-5(1) (1953);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3305(a) (1959); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-257(1) (1959);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 36-6-5(1) (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 231.40(5)(a) (Supp.
1967); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 34-379(a) (Supp. 1965).
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the "6% rule," since these states have adopted the basic form of the
Uniform Principal and Income Acts, changing only the stock dividend
allocation provisions to require allocation of small stock dividends
to income.43 Moreover, if a question arises as to whether the direc-
tions in the unitrust instrument are sufficiently explicit to avoid the
statutory provisions, it can be argued that such alternative statutory
allocation requirements are irrelevant to the unitrust, either because
there are not two receptacles in the unitrust between which to al-
locate, or because the unitrust is itself an allocation device. However,
it is remotely possible that the unitrust could be questioned in states
with some form of the "6% rule." This possibility arises because
allocation of stock dividends to income raises the ratio (and thus the
percentage) between income and the amount which represents com-
bined income and market value of assets in the traditional trust. If
the percentage represented by this ratio is greater than the unitrust
payout percentage, there is an accumulation of income in the unitrust.
For example, assume that a traditional trust with corpus of one
hundred dollars has dividend (cash) income of four dollars and
receives a stock dividend valued at one dollar, which stock dividend
qualifies under the local "6% rule." Assuming no capital appreciation,
the total value of corpus plus income is 105 dollars. The income of
five dollars (cash dividend plus stock dividend) represents nearly 4.8
per cent of the total value. But in a unitrust with the same receipts
which directs payouts of four per cent, the unitrust beneficiary gets
only $4.20. Thus, it could be argued that in the unitrust there has
been an accumulation of 80 cents.
The argument above, although remote, is not without merit. The
rule against accumulations is a rule of law, and thus applies regard-
less of the grantor's intent or direction.A Hence, where an accumula-
tion for adults is void, or where an accumulation for the surviving
spouse would be void due to statutory or instrument construction,
the situation described above would result in an illegal accumulation.
And, in the example, this would be true only because another state
law alternatively allocated the stock dividend to income in the
absence of a sufficiently specific direction.
The final state allocation rule to be considered, allocation of divi-
dends paid by regulated investment companies (mutual funds),
involves considerations similar to those set forth above concerning
the "6% rule" and the rule of the Uniform Principal and Income Acts.
In the absence of a controlling statute, courts have held that the
43. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:14A-2(A) (1953); N.Y. ESTATES, Pow=.S AND TnUSTS
LAw § 11-2.1(a)(1)(A) (McKinney 1967); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 3470.2 (Purdon
1964).
44. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.6 (Purdon Supp. 1966).
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entire dividend is allocated to income, in spite of segregation of the
distribution into capital gain dividends and dividends from income
of the corporation. 45  However, the Revised Uniform Principal and
Income Act explicitly splits the mutual fund dividend between corpus
and income,46 and the older uniform act does so by implication.47
Here, as above, these rules should not present the unitrustee with any
difficulties, but the rules should be kept in mind, especially in those
states where statutes have not made such allocation subject to
alteration by express provision in the trust instrment.
4. Spendthrift Provisions.-With a few well-recognized exceptions,48
restraints on the voluntary or involuntary alienation of a beneficiary's
interest in a trust are valid.49 Except where spendthrift provisions are
45. In re Gardner's Trust, 266 Minn. 127, 123 N.W.2d 69, 79 (1963). The legal
literature supports this view, either on the theory that gains on the sale of appreci-
ated stock by the mutual fund are really more like income from the stock-in-trade
of the corporation than like the sale of capital assets, Cohan & Dean, Legal, Tax and
Accounting Aspects of Fiduciary Apportionment of Stock Proceeds: The Non-Statutory
Pennsylvania Rules, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 157 (1957), or on the theory that if the
capital gains portion of the dividend is allocated to corpus, the portion remaining for
income is not enough to justify investment in such funds, because it favors the re-
mainderman to the detriment of the life tenant. Bogert, supra note 14. In this regard,
the Restatement provides that dividends of corporations engaged in the business of
buying and selling land shall be considered income (not corpus). RESTATE MENT §
236, comment x. This seems directly analogous to the mutual fund situation.
46. REVISED UNnmonM PruNcPAL AND INCOME AcT § 6. See also IDTAHo CODE ANN.
§ 68-1006(c) (Supp. 1967); MD. CODE ANN. art. 75B, § 6(c) (1965); N.Y. ESTATES,
PowEns AND TRusTs LAw § 11-2.1(e)(7) (1967); S.C. CODE ANN. § 67-509(c) (Supp.
1967); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 34-379(c) (Supp. 1965).
47. UNnm'oBu PmNcnA sr AND INCOME ACT § 5 (1931 version). See also ArA. CODE
tit. 58, § 79 (1960); Aruz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-1085(c) (1956); CAL. Civ. CODE
§ 730.06(c) (Supp. 1967); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 57-4-5(3) (1964); CONN. Gm.
STATS. ANN. § 45-113(3) (1959); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 690.06(3) (1944); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 30, § 164(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN'. § 58-905(3)
(1964); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 386.230(3) (3d ed. Baldwin 1963); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 4054 (1964); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 67-1905(3) (1962); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 33-5-5(3) (Supp. 1967); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-5(c) (1966); Oxr.A. STAT. ANN.
tit. 60, § 175.29(c) (1963); ORE. REv. STAT. § 129.050(3) (1963); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 20, § 3470.5(3) (Purdon 1964); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-706(3) (Supp. 1967);
TEX. REV. Crv. STAT. art. 7425b-29(c) (Vernon 1960); UTAH. CODE ANN. § 22-3-5(3)
(1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3305(c) (1959); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-257(3)
(1959); W. VA. CODE ANNT. § 36-6-5(3) (1966); Wis. STAT. ANNT. § 231.4 0(5)(c)
(Supp. 1967). A similar rule has been judicially adopted in Massachusetts. Tait v.
Peck, 346 Mass. 521, 194 N.E.2d 707 (1963).
48. Spendthrift provisions are generally not effective if they are in favor of a settor-
beneficiary, RESTATEm:ENT § 156, nor are they effective against the beneficiary's
wife or child for support or his wife for alimony, against creditors who supply the
beneficiary with necessities, against creditors for services rendered to preserve or benefit
the beneficiary's beneficial interest, or against a state or the United States to satisfy
claims against the beneficiary (for taxes). R-STATEmENT OF TRUSTS § 157.
49. RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 152. But see Sherrow v. Brookover, 174 Ohio St.
310, 189 N.E.2d 90 (1963) (adopts minority view and holds involuntary provisions
ineffective in Ohio), 24 OHIo ST. L.J. 567 (1963).
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held ineffective, the authorities almost unanimously agree that a
beneficiary's income interest may be protected,50 but there is less
agreement as to whether restraints on the alienation of the benefici-
ary's interest in the corpus are valid. If the beneficiary is entitled
to receive corpus at some future time, the weight of authority permits
the restraint.51 But if the corpus is presently payable to the benefici-
ary, or if he can withdraw principal on demand, the restraint ceases
to be effective. 2 In addition to these rather general rules, some states
have provided for limitations on the power to restrict alienation
through spendthrift provisions, by limiting the value of corpus which
is protected,53 by limiting the amount or per cent of income not
subject to involuntary alienation,M or by making excess income sub-
ject to claims of creditors.55
In a unitrust with an explicit spendthrift clause, in which the payout
percentage is less than, or equal to, total receipts for the year, the
payout could be equated entirely with income under a traditional
trust, and thus would generally be protected.- However, there could
be problems during years or in situations where the directed payout
exceeds receipts. The payout would probably be protected to the
extent that it did not exceed receipts, but the excess of payout over
receipts for the year might well be subject to creditors' claims, at
least on the payout dates.5 7 Furthermore, in states which make excess
income subject to claims, this unitrust could be particularly vul-
nerable, since the excess of payout over receipts could be considered
surplus.58 However, the trustee could certainly argue that many of
50. See 2 Scorr § 152.5. Moreover, discretionary and support trusts cannot be
reached by creditors of the beneficiary. RESTATEMENT OF TtusTS §§ 154, 155.
51. 2 ScoTT § 153, at 1075. But see id. at 1076.
52. RiESTATmmNT § 153(2), & comment c. But see 2 ScoTT § 153, at 1172 (3d ed.
1967).
53. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-19 (1959) ($200,000).
54. ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 58, § 1 (1960) ($1800 per year); N.J. STATS. ANN. tit. 2A,
§ 17-50 (1952) ($18 per week); N.Y. CrV. PROCEDURE LAw & Rujis § 5205(e)(1)
(McKinney 1963) (90%); N.C. GENi. STATS. § 41-9 (1966) ($500 per year); OLA.
STATS. ANN. tit. 60, § 175.25 (1963) ($5000 per year).
Dean Griswold has suggested a draft statute which would make all present and
future income in excess of $5000 per annum subject to voluntary and involuntary
alienation, regardless of contrary provisions in the instrument. In addition, if trust
income exceeds $12 per week, creditors could attach up to 10% of such income.
E. GESswOLD, SPENTnxrr TRusTs § 565, at 648 (2d ed. 1947) (§ 2 of draft statute).
55. CAL. CIv. CODE ANN. § 859 (West 1954); CONN. GEN. STATS. ANN. § 52-321
(1959); MicH. STATS. ANN. § 26.63 (1957); MnN. STATS. ANN. § 501.14 (1947);
MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 86-106 (1947); N.Y. ESTATES, Powlns AND TUsTs LAW
§ 7-3.4 (McKinney 1967); N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-03-10 (1960); S.D. CODE OF 1939,
§ 59.0306; Wis. STATS. ANN. § 231.13 (1957).
56. But see notes 53 & 54 supra, and accompanying text.
57. See note 52 supra, and accompanying text.
58. See note 55 supra, and accompanying text.
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these provisions relating to income restrictions are not applicable
to the unitrust, since the concept of "income" is alien to the unitrust.
Receipts cannot be equated to income, because they become, immedi-
ately upon receipt, a sort of undivided part of the fund. However,
since the fund is the amount to be managed by the trustee, the
unitrust is arguably nothing but corpus, with periodic payments from
corpus to the life tenant.5 9 But this argument would be worthless in
states which protect income, but subject the beneficiary's corpus
interests to attachment.60 Therefore, while a spendthrift unitrust
should generally be valid, arguments for its validity must vary from
state to state.
The remaining problem is whether the spendthrift unitrust will
qualify for the marital deduction. As a general proposition, spend-
thrift provisions do not destroy the marital deduction,61 but the marital
deduction has been disallowed in states which place a good-faith
restriction on an otherwise unlimited power of invasion by the
spouse.2 This reasoning would disqualify a unitrust which names
remaindermen, since the unitrust by its nature does not permit
complete exhaustion of the fund,63 but it would not disqualify a
spendthrift estate unitrust.
However, one further caution should be observed concerning
spendthrift clauses and the estate unitrust. A recent case 4 held that
59. Although the part of this argument involving the non-income nature of receipts
seems reasonable, it is suggested that the trustee tread lightly with the last analogy
to a constant corpus, since this would make the unitrust similar in form to a discretionary
trust. This is undesirable for marital deduction purposes. An argument to this effect
by the Commissioner, however, could be countered with the contention that even if
the unitrust is really nothing but corpus, it is not subject to attack as being discretionary,
since the express payout percentage in the instrument leaves the unitrustee with no
discretion in this matter.
60. See notes 51 & 52 supra, and accompanying text.
61. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(f)(7) (1967). Note that this Regulation ap-
pears in the discussion involving power of appointment trusts. However, it has been
cited to support the general proposition above. Morever, as will be discussed in the
next section of this note, it is doubtful whether the words in this section of the Regula-
tions which limit the approval of spendthrift clauses to power of appointment trusts,
are still binding after Northeastern Pa. Nat'l Bank & Tr. Co. v. United States, 387 U.S.
213 (1967).
62. Piatt v. Gray, 321 F.2d 79 (6th Cir. 1963); Gelb v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d
544, 548 (2d Cir. 1962); Estate of May v. Commissioner, 283 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.
1960). However, the deduction was permitted even when the instrument provided
for a gift over, where the surviving spouse was given an unlimited power of invasion,
in Hoffman v. McGinnes, 277 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1960).
63. Technically the unitrust could never be completely, depleted, since only a
stipulated percentage of the fund is distributed, thus always leaving something in the
fund for the next valuation date. Of course, the fund can easily become too small
for effective management, or even for any realistic value to the beneficiary.
64. Utley v. Graves, 258 F. Supp. 959 (D.D.C. 1966), irev'd sub nom. American
Sec. & Tr. Co. v. Utley, 382 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1967). See comments on this case
in the District Court, in 67 COLUm. L. REv. 780 (1967); 55 GEo. L.J. 952 (1967).
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spendthrift provisions were ineffective because by taking under the
will, a widower had foregone his statutory share and thus had given
a consideration for the trust. Since the general rule does not permit
spendthrift trusts for the benefit of the settlor, the court found that
by foregoing his statutory share, the widower had become a self-
settlor, and thus was not protected by the spendthrift clause. Al-
though this case was reversed on appeal, the reasoning could appear
elsewhere to defeat any spendthrift clause in a marital deduction
trust.65
B. The Unitrust Under Section 2056(b)(5)
In order for a "terminable interest" to qualify for the marital deduc-
tion, it must meet five requirements set forth in the Regulations."6
When Lovell proposed the unitrust concept, it would not have quali-
fied for the marital deduction as a power of appointment trust,
67
because it did not meet all these requirements. But after the North-
eastern Pennsylvania8 decision, the unitrust will qualify, under the
following reasoning. The disqualifying characteristic of the unitrust
under prior law was the possibility that payouts would be less, during
some years, than "all the income" of the trust. If less than all the
income were to be paid to the surviving spouse, it was required that
the income paid represent a fractional or percentile share of all the
income, or all the income from a fractional or percentile share of the
corpus.69 Since the payout percentage is based on a fund consisting
of both corpus and receipts, rather than on a specific amount of corpus
or of income, the Commissioner would have disallowed the marital
deduction entirely because of its incalculability.70 However, extension
65. But see RESTATEMENT § 156, comment f.
66. "(1) The surviving spouse must be entitled for life to all of the income from
the entire interest or a specific portion of the entire interest, or to a specific portion
of all the income from the entire interest. (2) The income payable to the surviving
spouse must be payable annually or at more frequent intervals. (3) The surviving
spouse must have the power to appoint the entire interest or the specific portion to
either herself or her estate. (4) The power in the surviving spouse must be exercisable
by her alone and (whether exercisable by will or during life) must be exercisable in
all events. (5) The entire interest or the specific portion must not be subject to a
power in any other person to appoint any part to any person other than the surviving
spouse." Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(a) (1967). Only parts (1) and (3) present
particular problems with respect to the unitrust.
67. See Lovell, supra note 1, at 218-19.
68. 387 U.S. 213 (1967).
69. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(c) (1967).
70. The reasoning here is similar to: Estate of May v. Commissioner, 283 F.2d 853
(2d Cir. 1960), regarding limits on the power of appointment; the related question of
limits on powers to invade corpus, discussed and criticized in Howard & Lederer,
The Marital Deduction: Powers of Invasion and the "All Events" Requirement, 40 ST.
JoHN's L. REV. 179 (1966); and the incalculability criterion of Rev. Rul. 60-385,
1960-2 Ctxm. BULL. 77, discussed in text accompanying note 24 supra.
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of the definition of "specific portion" in Northeastern Pennsylvania
to include stipulated amounts, from which can be calculated an
appropriate deduction amount using projected earnings tables, per-
mits use of the unitrust. Although the payout percentage is less than
all the income, application of the percentage to the original corpus
provides an amount from which the allowable marital deduction can
be calculated with the projected earnings figures."' But note that if
this projection procedure is pursued, the estate could lose part of the
benefit of the marital deduction under pecuniary or fractional share
marital deduction trusts. If the maximum marital deduction is first
calculated and this amount set aside in trust, and then the computa-
tions above are applied, the allowable marital deduction will be only
a "specific portion" of such maximum marital deduction. This problem
can be eliminated by providing in the will that the deduction-maximiz-
ing computations and the income-projection calculations be used
together to arrive at the final determination of the amount for fund-
ing the trust. Hence, the will should provide that the corpus of the
trust, as determined pursuant to the deduction-maximizing computa-
tion, shall be increased by an amount such that the finally-determined
income-projection figure will equal the maximum allowable marital
deduction.
This discussion assumes that the marital deduction power of appoint-
ment unitrust provision will give the surviving spouse the appropriate
power of appointment, which will not differ from that of a traditional
trust. Therefore, one need only consider cautions suggested by prior
litigation in this area.72
The considerations above have dealt with specific points of concern
under the Regulations. In addition, the unitrust form has a character-
istic which should recommend it to the Commissioner. A recurring
point in the Regulations is that the surviving spouse must have the
"requisite degree of beneficial enjoyment;" that is, the governing in-
strument must not evidence an intent to deprive the spouse of such
beneficial enjoyment.73  One of -the most favorable aspects of the
71. Of course, if the payout percentage is set high enough so that it will always con-
sume some corpus, or if an alternative clause stipulating that the spouse is always to
be paid at least all the "income" as traditionally defined, there should be no difficulty
in obtaining the deduction.
72. See, e.g., Piatt v. Gray, 201 F. Supp. 401 (W.D. Ky. 1961), aff'd, 321 F.2d
79 (6th Cir. 1963), and the power of appointment aspects of the discussion in Gelb
v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1962); Estate of May v. Commissioner, 283
F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1960); Hoffman v. McGinnes, 277 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1960). See
also Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(g) (1967), especially subsec. (3), and -5(j); Dane,
Marital Deduction Questions-Three Current Tax Issue& and Suggested Solutions, 103
ThusTs & ESTATES 112 (1964).
73. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(f)(1), (3), (4), (5) (1967).
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marital deduction unitrust is its indication that the surviving spouse
is the prime object of the testator's bounty, with the implication
that considerations after her welfare is assured amount, at most,
to "what is left." However, since the unitrust permits the life
tenant a full share of fund appreciation, it does not violate Regulation
proscriptions against the holding of "unproductive" property, at least
in the sense indicated by the Treasury Department 4
There are, however, two potential problems peculiar to the unitrust.
First, since the nature of the unitrust requires valuation of the fund
after the receipts have been added and appreciation has been realized,
there is no provision for income during the first year of the trust. This
would disqualify the unitrust as a marital deduction.15 Therefore, it
would be necessary to provide specifically in the marital deduction
clause of the will that the first payout valuation will be made at the
time of the original transfer of property to the unitrust, with monthly
payouts of this amount prorated until the first regular valuation date.
Second, if the trust is small, a larger payout percentage will be
required to provide the spouse with a meaningful income. On the
other hand, the larger the payout percentage, the more quickly will
the fund be depleted below a worthwhile level from the standpoint
of the unitrustee.76 While this basic reasoning is theoretically ap-
plicable to any unitrust in which the payout percentage exceeds
"income," a minor excess will present no practical restrictions, since
the life expectancy of the surviving spouse will not be sufficient to
overcome the effects of inflation and fund appreciation.
C. When to Use the Unitrust
1. General Considerations-Size of the Fund.-The basic considera-
tions, from the settlor's standpoint, as to whether to use a unitrust are
much the same as those for any other type of trust device. That is, the
questions of whether to create a trust or make an outright gift,
whether to employ a power of appointment or estate trust, whether
to attach spendthrift provisions, or whether to grant the trustee full
discretion in making additional corpus distributions, are not affected
by unitrust considerations. However, the size of the conveyance
in trust may affect the choice between unitrust and traditional trust.
74. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(f)(4) (1967).
75. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-4(a) (1967).
76. For example, assume a $100,000 unitrust with a 20% payout during a period of
5% annual appreciation and 5% annual receipts, and assume a full payout during
the first year before effective management has begun; the fund will amount to less
than $28,000 at the end of 10 years, giving the life tenant only $5,600 for the next
year. This aspect of the unitrust will be examined in more detail in the next section of
this note.
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In each of the tables below, it is assumed that the trust is originally
funded with 100,000 dollars, that each trust produces five per cent
annual yield, and that the corpus appreciates at the rate of five per
cent annually. Under these assumptions, a traditional trust paying
out all income will produce as illustrated in Table I. Comparing these
results with those of a unitrust with a payout percentage of five per
cent in Table II, it is seen that payment to the beneficiary is initially
greater under the unitrust. The difference between the trusts in
payouts for successive years gradually diminishes until beneficial
income from the traditional trust surpasses that from the unitrust (in
year 21), and the corpus of the traditional trust grows more rapidly
than does that of the unitrust.77 However, when the unitrust per-
centage is reduced to four per cent, shown in Table III, the unitrust
funds grows faster than does the traditional corpus example, and
eventually surpasses the traditional trust both in corpus size (year 2)
and in beneficial payments (year 24).
Table IV illustrates the effect of a ten per cent payout unitrust
provision. Here, the payout percentage equals that of the combined
receipts and appreciation, with the indicated progressive reduction
of the fund, and consequently of the payouts. But note, as demon-
strated in Table V, that when the payout percentage on the same trust
is reduced to eight per cent, or less than the accrual percentage,
both fund and payouts steadily increase. Hence the general rule for
determination of unitrust payout percentage is as follows:
When the payout percentage equals that of combined receipts and apprecia-
tion, the fund is gradually reduced. The greater the excess of payout
percentage over combined receipts and appreciation, the more rapid is
depletion of the fund and of subsequent payouts. Conversely, when the
payout percentage is less than that of combined receipts and appreciation,
the fund progressively increases. The greater the excess of accruals over
payout percentage, the more rapid is the growth of both fund and payouts.
From these basic propositions, it is apparent that the payout per-
centage should be set below combined receipt and appreciation
percentages.
77. Unitrust payout is initially greater because the percentage factor is applied to a
larger fund-a fund which contains income and appreciation. The excess represents
payment of a share of the appreciation before such appreciation is reflected in the
fund assets. This means that less of the appreciation is actually attributed to the suc-
cessive fund in the unitrust, resulting in the faster growth of the traditional corpus.

































78. Here it is assumed that corpus appreciates at the rate of 5% annually, and that














































































79. Here it is assumed that corpus appreciates at the rate of 5% annually, and that





























































































80. Here it is assumed that corpus appreciates at the rate of 5% annually, and that
5% net yield is realized annually on the fair market value of the fund at the beginning
of each year.
















































81. Here it is assumed that corpus appreciates at the rate of 5% annually, and that




TABLE V-EIGHT PER CENT
Year Fund After Fund for Next Year's
Prior 8% New Payout Payout
Payout ValuationS2
1 $100,000 $110,000 $8,800
2 101,200 111,320 8,906
3 102,414 112,655 9,012
4 103,643 114,007 9,121
5 104,886 115,375 9,230
6 106,145 116,759 9,341
7 107,418 118,160 9,453
8 108,707 119,578 9,566
9 110,012 121,013 9,681
10 111,332 122,465 9,797
15 118,174 129,991 10,399
20 125,437 137,981 11,038
25 133,147 146,462 11,719
82. Here it is assumed that corpus appreciates at the rate of 5% annually, and that
5% net yield is realized annually on the fair market value of the fund at the beginning
of each year.
Annual payout amounts listed for various percentages in the last
column of each unitrust table indicate that a unitrust funded with
100,000 dollars will provide only a modest income for the surviving
spouse. If the figures in Table V are doubled, however, the income
becomes more reasonable, and would probably suflice to maintain
most widows.83
The larger unitrust provides the same relative advantages as does
the smaller unitrust, but also permits more variation in form. For
example, in very large estates where the widow would not need the
entire payout of the maximum marital deduction unitrust, the settlor
could project the approximate size of his estate and the approximate
amount desired annually for the widow, calculate an appropriate
payout percentage and initial fund for such amount, and thereby
be able to determine the amount remaining for other beneficiaries,
including charities.
2. Funding the Unitrust-Types of Assets.-Keeping in mind that
any marital deduction trust must be funded only with assets included
83. For very rough approximations of results for multiples of $100,000, the statistics
in the tables can be multiplied by similar factors. But it should be noted that the
figures in these tables are for purposes of illustration only, and are no more precise
than continuous and compounded rounding off to the nearest dollar will permit.
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in the decedent's gross estate,8 the unitrust may safely be funded
with the same types of assets as traditional trusts. However, as indi-
cated above,85 the unitrustee and settlor need not be concerned with
whether trust assets are "productive" in the traditional sense. There-
fore the unitrust may be funded with, and the trustee may freely
invest in, common stocks, 86 mutual funds, 87 and corporate bonds.88
However, the nature of unitrust mechanics limits the trustee somewhat
in his investment asset choices. Since each unitrust payout must
consist partially of fund appreciation, 9 some assets must be liquidated
annually to meet payout obligations. Hence, a significant portion of
the unitrust assets must be readily marketable. Lovell suggests that
this would largely preclude investment in mortgages, real estate, and
tax-exempt bonds.90 Except for this restriction, the unitrustee is
limited only by the requirement of prudence in managing the fund.
3. Relevance of the Spouse's Non-Trust Income.-Non-trust in-
come 9' of the surviving spouse often causes difficulties where the trust
instrument provides for trustee discretion in distributing to the spouse
"as her needs require," for her support, or for her "comfort and well
being."92 In such cases, the question of the testator's intent arises;
that is, did the settlor intend that the trustee take the spouse's other
income into account in determining her "requirements"? The unitrus-
tee should meet none of these difficulties, since he has no discretion
in payouts.
84. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2056(a).
85. See text accompanying note 74 supra.
86. Standard & Poor's composite yield statistics for 500 corporate stocks during the




Compiled from STANDARD & PooR's TRADE & SEcURTmEs STATISIcS, CURRENT STA-
TnsTicS, Feb., 1968, at 31 (statistics dated Jan., 1968).
87. Mutual fund dividend yield in 1960 averaged 2.8% income and 2.3% in capital
gain. BOGERT § 858. This total of 5.1%-would benefit the life tenant under a uni-
trust, thus making mutual funds a reasonable investment.
88. Statistics compiled by Moody's Investors Service indicate that the average






Compiled from MooDy's BOND REcORD (Year End Edition), Mar. 8, 1968, at 135.
89. See note 77 supra.
90. Lovell, supra note 1, at 219.
91. "Non-trust income" here means income from sources other than the marital
deduction unitrust, including income from other non-marital deduction trusts.
92. Halbach, supra note 17; McLucas, Discretionary Trusts-Guides for Exercise of
Power to Distribute Income and Principal, 97 TRUsTs & ESTATES 210 (1958).
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It has been suggested that the estate trust is useful when the
surviving spouse has substantial income from independent sources,
since income may be accumulated in the estate trust until needed 3
Similarly, an estate unitrust, combined with additional discretionary
distribution powers in the unitrustee, could be accommodated, for
income tax purposes, to the spouse's outside income. In addition to
this general consideration, or in the alternative, the payout percentage
could be diminished to an appropriate level, even below the receipt
percentage in an estate unitrust. 4
IV. Tim UNITRUST AND SUBCHAPTER J
When considering the income tax aspects of the unitrust concept, it
will be necessary to attempt to relate the terms "receipts," "fund," and
"payouts" to more traditional trust concepts. For example, the term
"receipts" is used in the trust concept partially to avoid the con-
flict of interest implications of the word "income." For purposes of
subchapter J it is also important that "income" is not equated with
"receipts." Distributable net income (DNI) is calculated on the basis
of the trust's taxable income.95 Hence the portion of "receipts" at-
tributable to cash dividends, rents, and interest are obviously in-
cluded in the trust's DNI 96 However, section 643(a) (3) provides
that capital gains are excluded in computing DNI to the extent that
they are not distributed, and are allocated to corpus. Under the uni-
trust, each payout includes some distribution of the fund in excess
of receipts, whenever the payout percentage is equal to or greater
than the receipt percentage. Therefore it may be necessary to provide
in the unitrust instrument that capital gains receipts shall be treated,
for purposes of subchapter J, as allocable to "corpus" to the extent
that they are not paid out pursuant to the percentage payout direc-
tions. Then there could be no question that the capital gains are to
be included in DNI only to the extent that they are included in the
payouts for the year.
Although payouts for any given year are calculated on the basis of
the effect of the prior year's receipts on the fund, it must be remem-
bered that this method of determining payouts is only a valuation
device, and not a calculated distribution of the prior year's receipts.
Stated differently, the payouts for 1969, as calculated on the last day
93. ABA REAL PRoPERTY, PROBATE AxD TRUST SECTION, REPORT or THE Sun-
comnwnTE ON ESTATE PLANNING AND THE MARITAL DEDUCTION 82, 93 (Aug. 11-13,
1963).
94. For the effects of such adjustments, see tables above.
95. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 643(a).
96. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 61(a).
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of 1968, will be paid from the receipts during 1969, not 1968. If the
required payouts exceed 1969 liquid receipts, the unitrustee must
either sell stock to meet the payments or distribute property of the
value of the deficiency. If he sells stock and distributes cash, he
has distributed capital gains, which then must be included in DNI.
If the unitrustee makes up the deficiency by distributing shares of
stock, it can be argued that he has distributed corpus, and DNI
would be reducedY7 Such treatment would, however, reduce the basis
to the unitrust of shares remaining in the fund.98 Moreover, this would
not be a truly discretionary distribution, since it is made to discharge
an obligation of the unitrust, so even a distribution of stock should
be treated as a distribution of capital gains to the extent indicated.
Although the unitrust concept frees the trustee from conflict of
interest problems of allocation presented by the traditional trust,99 the
unitrustee still must face certain aspects of allocation under sub-
cliapter J. Since a trust is treated for income tax purposes as a
conduit, the trustee should "fragment" distributions to the beneficiary
so that the beneficiary may properly calculate his income tax, taking
full advantage of capital gain and tax-free provisions.
Assuming that the fair market value of the unitrust fund steadily
appreciates from year to year, and that the unitrust instrument does
not provide for discretionary distributions or invasions of corpus, the
"throwback rule"00 will not apply to the unitrust. So long as the
payout percentage at least equals the receipt percentage, the unitrust
will not accumulate "income," and there can thus be no "accumulation
distribution," 1' 1 and if the payout percentage is less than the receipt
percentage, payouts will not fully consume DNI for any year. For
unitrusts providing for distributions in addition to the payout per-
centage amount, however, the throwback rule may apply to those
unitrusts in which the payout percentage is less than the receipt
percentage, as in the case of certain "estate unitrusts" and non-marital
deduction unitrusts.
97. See Note, Taxation of Capital Gains Realized by Trusts, 12 TAX L. REv. 99,
109 (1956).
98. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 1016. See also Barclay, Lot of Income Beneficiaries:
Remedies, 104 TRUSTS & ESTATES 277, 278-79 (1965); Note, Principal and Income
Allocation of Stock Distributions-The Six Per Cent Rule, 64 MicH. L. REv. 856, 869
(1966); Note, Common Stocks in Trust, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 228, 256 (1964). For
the effects of expense allocation between corpus and distributions, see ABA REAL,
PROPERTY, PROBATE & TRUST SECTION, REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMTTEE ON TRUSTS AND
TRUSTS AND ESTATES: TAX GENEsis OF BENEFICIAlY CONFLICT 192, 201 (Aug. 11-13,
1963).
99. See Part II supra.
100. INT. REv. CODE Of 1954, §§ 666, 668.
101. INT. BEv. CODE of 1954, § 665(b).
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The employment of two unitrusts in the estate plan-one for the
marital deduction and one for the rest of the residuary estate-may be
useful in reducing taxes to the settlor's surviving family, 02 and would
be particularly useful for smaller estates. For example, assume that
two such unitrusts are created, one to take advantage of the marital
deduction, and the other providing that the unitrustee is to make
annual payouts of two per cent to each of the testator-settlor's three
children or their issue. The widow's income from a similar payout
percentage would be accumulated in the non-marital deduction
trust 10 3 so long as her income from the marital deduction trust is
sufficient for her needs. Now, in a smaller estate, the payout per-
centage for the marital deduction trust can be set at a high level
(for example, ten per cent0 4 or more), so that the marital deduction
unitrust is progressively consumed. Then when the marital deduction
trust no longer produces sufficient income for the widow, the non-
marital deduction trustee may either make annual payments to sup-
plement the widow's marital deduction trust income, or, under an
unrestricted discretionary provision, could pay out her accumulated
share or even her entire share of the non-marital deduction unitrust,
this amount being added to the fund of the marital deduction unitrust,
either pursuant to express direction in the unitrust instrument, or at
the direction of the widow.105
The discussion in this section of the note has presupposed that the
unitrust must be administered under existing tax laws and Regulations.
However, some of the difficulties and uncertainties indicated above
could be resolved by the Commissioner through minor adjustments
to the existing Regulations. For example, DNI computation questions
could be eliminated by creating a presumption that unitrust DNI
equals the payout percentage as adjusted under section 643. In the
alternative, the Regulations could gear unitrust DNI to the projected
income percentage for the current year. It is assumed that the Com-
missioner, after the decision in Northeastern Pennsylvania,06 will have
to provide a percentage figure which may be applied to extrapolate
the marital deduction amount from testamentary provisions for
periodic payment of specific sums to the widow. The Regulations
could provide that unitrust DNI equals the payout percentage
102. See Halbach, supra note 17, at 1425.
103. See INT. RFlv. CODE of 1954, § 663(c) ("separate share rule").
104. See Table IV above. But it is possible that if the payout percentage is set too
high, the Commissioner will allege that the settlor has created a terminable interest,
105. If the widow herself arranges the addition to the marital deduction unitrust,
however, she may lose the advantage of spendthrift provisions therein. See note 48
supra.
106. 387 U.S. 213 (1967).
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amount, but only to the extent that it does not exceed the projected
income percentage amount as adjusted for capital gains distributions
in section 643. Such presumptions could be overcome in specific
cases upon a showing by the trustee that a different computation
would better achieve the purposes of the Code.
V. CONCLUSION
In determining whether to use the unitrust concept rather than a
traditional trust, the settlor, his attorney, and his trustee must attempt
to arrive at some sort of net benefit under one device or the other,
as applied to the needs and desfres of the particular settlor and his
family. As has been shown throughout this note, there are many
variables to be considered, and it is possible that the unitrust, or
some types of unitrusts, will not be useful in some states, and in
some individual situations. However, the unitrust generally has all the
advantages and uses of the traditional trust, and a broad comparison
of the two types of trusts indicates that the unitrust can be extremely
useful in most estate plans. There are some drawbacks, one of the
most significant of which is the fact that its novelty may initially
give rise to some interpretive litigation, instigated by private parties,
such as creditors of the beneficiary, or by the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue. But it must be noted that this risk of litigation is, at most,
only a possibility, and as such must be weighed against the strong
attributes of the unitrust concept, including the unitrustee's freedom
to manage for maximum benefit to all beneficial parties, and the flexi-
bility permitted by abandoning the restrictive concepts of income and
corpus. Although the unitrust is not a panacea for all trust problems,
and it does not completely revise current trust law, the unitrust con-
cept should be eagerly accepted by the trust industry as a solution to
many of the problems spawned by the failure of trust law to keep
pace with changes in trust administration.
Louis F. Comus, JR.
10491968] NOTES
